Each of the four defendants were charged separately with driving offences as a result of an internal investigation into the force’s VUE system installed in their vehicles, which was generating notification about speeding incidents. It was identified from the system that there were instances of officers speeding when they had not yet completed the necessary training to operate vehicles at speeds above the legal limit (‘standard response’).
At the time, each defendant was a ‘basic’ driver, the minimum level of driving classification for their force. They were trained to drive police vehicles and respond to routine situations, but they were not permitted to engage in pursuits or use emergency equipment as a matter of force policy. They were, in each separate incident, responding to an incident which they regarded as an emergency.
The four cases centred on the statutory defence under Section 87(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The issues were twofold. Firstly, with the interpretation of Section 87(3), and whether the exemption applied to those who had not been trained in driving vehicles at high speeds. Secondly, whether the circumstances arising in each case amounted to use of the relevant vehicle for a policing purpose, and whether travelling at the speed limit would have hindered the use of the vehicle for that purpose.
Following multiple oral and written submissions, the case against each defendant was discontinued.
Emma was instructed by Paul Reddy of Gorvins Solicitors.
Analysis
The cases are representative of the correct interpretation of the exemption under s.87(1) RTRA 1984, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v De Meulemeester [2023] EWCA Crim 1240.
S.87(1) provides an exemption for police vehicles for speed limits if being used for police purposes, and if the observance of the speed limit would likely hinder the use of the vehicle at the particular time.
Subsections (2) and (3) were not part of the original exemption. They were introduced to include National Crime Agency vehicles, concurrently with the creation of the Agency and by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. Those subsections provided an exception of the exemption, stating that it does not apply unless it is being driven by a person who has been trained in driving vehicles at high speeds.
It was submitted that the proper reading of the later sections is that they are only concerned with vehicles driven for National Crime Agency purposes. They therefore did not affect the pre-existing statutory provisions relating to vehicles driven for a police purpose. Put simply, the level of training of a police officer did not matter for the purposes of the exemption, and was a matter of policy only.
The interpretation was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in De Meulemeester, per Mrs Justice May:
“We accept that, as a matter of construction, the restriction in subsection (3) applies to NCA drivers and does not affect the position of police drivers to whom subsection (1) applies and whose position in relation to exemptions is not impacted by the later subsections.”
The statutory defence is therefore, for now, applicable to police vehicle being driven for a policing purpose, regardless of the level of training of the driver. The interpretation is a literal one, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal.